inflows (Enders and Sandler, 1996) . Terrorism, like civil conflicts, may cause spillover costs among neighboring countries as a terrorist campaign in a neighbor dissuades capital inflows, or a regional multiplier causes lost economic activity in the terrorism-ridden country to resonate throughout the region. 1 In some instances, terrorism may impact specific industries as 9/11 did on airlines and tourism (Drakos, 2004; Ito and Lee, 2004) . Another cost is the expensive security measures that must be instituted following large attacks -e.g., the massive homeland security outlays since 9/11 (Enders and Sandler, 2006a, Chapter 10) . Terrorism also raises the costs of doing business in terms of higher insurance premiums, expensive security precautions, and larger salaries to at-risk employees.
The size in terms of GDP and the diversity of an economy have much to do with the ability of a country to withstand terrorist attacks without showing significant economic effects.
Yemen's shipping industry suffered greatly after the terrorist attacks on the USS Cole and the Limburg diverted half of Yemen's port activities to competitive facilities in Djibouti and Oman due to a 300% increase in insurance premiums (US Department of State Fact Sheet, 2002) . This diversion resulted in a loss of $3.8 million per month to Yemen's shipping industry. Such losses have a greater potential economic impact in a country with a smaller GDP, because they represent a greater share of GDP. Although the same number of people may lose jobs, the percentage of the work force affected is greater for smaller than for larger countries. The degree of diversification of the impacted economy also matters. In a more diversified and developed economy, such shipping losses may have a temporary influence as resources (capital and labor) are reallocated to other industries (including those in the export sector) or better security measures are deployed to allay concerns. When a small country's export sector is tied to a few activities (e.g., shipping), an attack that affects one of these activities will have a significant impact on the country's foreign exchange earnings. The ability for released resources to bolster other exporting activities is limited if there are few alternatives.
This paper has four purposes. First and most important, the paper takes stock of the literature on the economic consequences of terrorism and evaluates the methodology used to date. The literature dates back to the early 1990s, with most of the contributions coming after 9/11. Second, macroeconomic influences of terrorism are distinguished from microeconomic sector-or industry-specific effects. Third, terrorism impacts in developed countries are contrasted with those in developing countries. Fourth, we indicate how researchers can better account for economic consequences in developing countries.
The remainder of the paper contains eight sections. Section 1 reviews concepts and definitions that are necessary for understanding the economic consequences of terrorism. In Section 2, we investigate how the United States, representative of other developed nations, cushioned the blow and sped recovery from the unprecedented attacks of 9/11 through monetary, fiscal, and other policies. Section 3 reviews and evaluates some macroeconomic studies of the impact of terrorism, whereas Section 4 contrasts anticipated differences between how developing and developed countries are affected by terrorism. In Section 5, we review and analyze past microeconomic studies of the economic fallout from terrorism. Section 6 discusses past methodologies. Section 7 provides future directions and conclusions.
Essential Concepts
Studies over the last decade have established that internal conflicts can have significant economic consequences in terms of reduced growth within a conflict-ridden country (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Collier et al., 2003; Collier and Sambanis, 2002) and in neighboring countries Sandler, 2002, 2004) . A civil war is a broader conflict than terrorism, since the former usually involves a minimum of 1000 deaths and may result in tens of thousands of casualties, while a terrorist incident results, on average, in a single death (Sandler, 2003) .
Thus, a country may be plagued with at least one terrorist incident in, say, ten of ten years, but experience relatively few deaths and modest property damage. Terrorism is a tactic that may or may not be associated with a civil war, insurrection, or other form of political violence. As such, terrorism typically involves little loss of life and property. Naturally, there are exceptions, such as the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings or the December 21, 1988 downing of Pan Am flight 107, where two to three hundred people perished, respectively. But even in these cases, the loss of life, though tragic, is small compared with most internal conflicts so that the likely macroeconomic impact of terrorist events is not anticipated to rival civil wars.
This prediction may change under a few scenarios: a large-scale attack like 9/11, a protracted terrorist campaign with many deadly incidents, or some devastating attack on a developing country's export sector (recall the Yemen shipping example). One should not expect that a modest number of terrorist incidents in most countries will greatly affect the countries' income growth. Sector-specific microeconomic influences are often the most likely consequences from terrorism.
Cost distinction
There are numerous cost distinctions that could be drawn regarding terrorism losses.
Direct costs, for example, involve the immediate losses associated with a terrorist attack or campaign and include damaged goods, the value of lives lost, the costs associated with injuries (including lost wages), destroyed structures, damaged infrastructure, and reduced short-term commerce. In contrast, indirect or secondary costs concern attack-related subsequent losses, such as raised insurance premiums, increased security costs, greater compensation to those at high-risk locations, and costs tied to attack-induced long-run changes in commerce. Indirect costs may surface as reduced growth in GDP, lost FDI, changes in inflation, or increased unemployment. A judgment must be made as to how to distinguish between direct and indirect costs, in which any distinction would strike some researchers as arbitrary.
Fortunately, this distinction is not really necessary to characterize the economic impact of terrorism, which can be represented in terms of some well-defined macroeconomic (e.g., real per capita GDP growth) or microeconomic variable (e.g., reduced tourist receipts). These variables then represent the consequences of terrorism in terms of aggregate or sectoral activity. If lost output, casualties, and damaged infrastructure are sufficiently large, then they will affect the economy's productive capacity with macroeconomic or microeconomic repercussions. The identification of these impacts is of greater importance than the mere tally of losses if policy is to ameliorate the economic ramifications of terrorism. Thus, we concentrate on relating terrorism to macroeconomic and microeconomic variables that policy can be designed to bolster.
Domestic versus transnational terrorism
Terrorism comes in two essential types: domestic and transnational. Domestic terrorism is homegrown with most consequences for the host country, its institutions, citizens, property, and policies. In a domestic terrorist incident, the victim and perpetrators are from the host country. The Oklahoma City bombing on April 19, 1995 was a domestic terrorist event as was the kidnapping of members of Parliament by Colombian terrorists. Many ethno-nationalist conflicts (e.g., the Tamils of Sri Lanka) are associated with mostly domestic terrorism, unless the rebels desire to target citizens from other countries to publicize their cause to the world.
Domestic events tend to outnumber transnational terrorist events by eight to one (Enders and Sandler, 2006) .
In contrast, transnational terrorism involves more than one country. This international aspect can stem from the victims, targets, institutions, supporters, terrorists, or implications. For example, 9/11 is a transnational terrorist event because the victims were from many different countries, the mission was financed and planned from abroad, the terrorists were foreigners, and the implications of the events (e.g., financial and security) were transnational. Transnational terrorist attacks often entail transboundary externalities: actions or authorities in one country impose uncompensated consequences on person or property in another country. Thus, spillover costs can result so that the economic impact of a terrorist event may transcend the host country.
The toppling of the World Trade Center towers on 9/11 killed many British nationals and had ramifications for British financial institutions. Chen and Siems (2004, showed that 9/11 negatively influenced average returns on stock markets globally. In fact, the 11-day cumulative average abnormal returns were larger on the London, Frankfurt, Paris, Toronto, Amsterdam, Switzerland, Italy, and Hong Kong stock markets than on the New York Stock Exchange following 9/11. The four blasts on 9/11 reverberated on capital markets worldwide.
The distinction between domestic and transnational terrorism is of utmost importance when determining the right data for calculating the economic consequences of terrorism.
Suppose that we want to relate the growth in real per capita GDP to countries' level of terrorism.
For a country plagued by both domestic and transnational terrorism, it is necessary that all terrorist events are included if the estimated coefficient on the terrorist term is to be properly interpreted. If, for example a country has just one transnational terrorist event, but twenty domestic terrorist incidents, and if, moreover, only transnational terrorist events are included, then the terrorism coefficient is going to attribute its impact to one event when there are twenty one events. When, instead, a country has no transnational terrorism but is plagued by domestic terrorism, a drop in growth will be attributed to nonterrorism causes, even though domestic terrorism may be the culprit. The argument that transnational terrorism can serve as a proxy for all terrorism is not necessarily valid, because no one really knows whether the two types of terrorism are correlated. There are countries (e.g., Sri Lanka) with lots of domestic terrorism and little transnational terrorism and other countries with lots of transnational terrorism and little domestic terrorism. Even if the two types of terrorism were perfectly correlated, the magnitude of the terrorism coefficient must be interpreted with care when domestic terrorist incidents are excluded. Moreover, the potential correlation between domestic terrorist incidents and other independent variables remains a concern. The exclusion of domestic terrorism is an issue for cross-section and country-specific studies of the consequences of terrorism on macroeconomic variables.
This problem can be partly circumvented if an internal conflict measure is introduced as an independent variable (see Blomberg, Hess, and Orphanides, 2004) , because domestic terrorism is anticipated to be somewhat correlated with internal conflict. The latter can then control for the influence of domestic terrorism. The terrorism coefficient would thus reflect the impact of transnational terrorism and not terrorism per se.
In the case of net foreign direct investment (NFDI), transnational terrorism is the appropriate terrorism variable when terrorist attacks have been directed at foreign investments or their personnel and there is little or no domestic terrorism (Enders and Sandler, 1996) . If foreign tourism is being investigated, then transnational terrorist attacks is appropriate when such attacks are against tourist venues or infrastructure serving tourism. Moreover, any domestic terrorism must be far from these tourists so that they do not feel threatened. 
On terrorism data

Macroeconomic Effects of Terrorism
An economy as rich and diverse as that of the United States is anticipated to withstand most terrorist events with little macroeconomic consequences. During most years, the United
States experienced few terrorist events on its own soil -e.g., in 1998, 2000, and the years following 2001, there were no terrorist events in the United States  US Department of State, 1999 State, -2004 . Moreover, the breadth of US economic activities is sufficiently diverse to absorb the impact of an attack by shifting activities to unaffected sectors.
A mature market economy generates signals (i.e., prices and profits) to direct resources to where returns are the greatest. These signals also help channel resources to where rebuilding and other responses are required. If an impacted sector has a slow recovery, then some resources will leave for better short-term prospects and will return when prospects improve.
The immediate costs of typical terrorist acts, such as kidnappings, assassinations, or bombings, are localized, not unlike ordinary crimes. Currently, crimes such as identity theft have far greater potential economic consequences than terrorism to developed countries. In most developed countries, terrorism generally causes a substitution from sectors vulnerable to terrorism into relatively safe areas and, thus, does not affect the entire macroeconomy.
3 If airlines become risky, factors of production will shift from the airline sector to other relatively safer sectors. Of course, a terrorist act of the magnitude of 9/11 can shake confidence and influence sufficiently many sectors to have macroeconomics repercussions. But as we show below, developed countries are positioned to take actions to limit these impacts.
This representation is in marked contrast to small economies in which terrorism is prevalent and affects daily activities as in Colombia, Israel, and the Basque region of Spain. For these economies, terrorism can reduce GDP and curb development, especially during prolonged campaigns (e.g., Israel since September 27, 2000). Protracted terrorism leads to the anticipation of future events, which create risk premiums that limit activities in terrorism-prone sectors.
Investors, both at home and abroad, may decide to direct their assets to safer activities in other countries. If terrorists succeed in scaring away investments, they may be emboldened to take further actions to cause economic losses. 
US experience in light of 9/11
Review of Macroeconomic Literature on Terrorism Impacts
The literature on the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism only began in 2003 and involves only a handful of studies. One set of studies examines the influence of various terrorist variables on real per capita GDP growth, while a second set of studies consists of case studies of a country experiencing a long-term terrorist campaign. Two basic findings derive from these studies: (i) the effects of terrorism on reduced growth is on average, quite small, and (ii) countries with sustained terrorist campaigns may lose over 10% of their GDP. difference in the consequences of terrorism between the two estimating procedures. It is curious that terrorism's average influence on growth for the entire sample is not reflected in any of the panels where terrorism is the greatest concern. Moreover, their large cross-section analysis did not discriminate between different time periods where terrorism changed in character -for example, from left-wing to fundamentalist groups. Previous studies showed that terrorism became more deadly with the rise of fundamentalist terrorism in the 1980s and beyond (Enders and Sandler, 2000) . As a consequence, the increased intensity of an "average" terrorist incident may have a greater economic impact in the latter half of the sample period.
In another set of panel estimates, BHO (2004) changed their terrorism indicator to terrorist incidents per capita. This new measure indicates the prevalence of terrorism in terms of the likelihood that incidents will affect someone in the population. The per capita measure also accounts for the level of terrorism. This change gives a significant terrorism impact on per capita GDP growth for the full sample, the nondemocratic panel, the OECD panel, and the African panel. Moreover, the impact of terrorism varies widely between the full sample and the smaller cohort panels, leading one to conclude that the full sample "average" picture may not be representative of how smaller cohorts or individual countries respond to terrorism.
Toward the end of the paper, BHO (2004) performed some panel estimates regarding terrorism's influence of the share investment to GDP and the share of government spending to GDP. These estimates are quite useful because they establish the pathway by which terrorism effects economic growth. BHO found that terrorism increased the government spending share, while it decreased the investment share. This reallocation can affect growth by diverting government activities away from more productive activities to security. Moreover, reduced investment will limit growth directly.
A second cross-sectional study by Tavares (2004) 
where GrowthGDP pc is per capita GDP growth. On the right-hand side of (2), there is lagged per capita GDP growth, per capita GDP, a terrorism measure, a natural disaster index, a currency index, additional controls, and an error term. The terrorism measure is either the total number of attacks per capita or the total number of casualties per capita. Tavares Using instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity between terrorism and real per capita GDP growth, Tavares found that the terrorism variable had a small but significant negative impact on GDP growth of 0.038% (Tavares, 2004, 
where it y Δ is country' i's growth of per capita GDP in year t, indicates that a single terrorist incident in country i in year t reduces annual growth for that year by 0.029%. Since the model is dynamic, this growth effect has some persistent. An interesting finding involves the positive coefficient on the interaction term T it × R it , for which the effect of a typical terrorist attack decreases as the level of political freedom increases. That is, democracies are better able to withstand terrorist attacks than other types of governments with less flexible
institutions. Yet another interpretation is that democracies are better prepared to weathered attacks because they rely on markets to allocate resources. By not including R it as an additional argument in (3), the coefficient of the interaction term is probably biased in an upward fashion.
Case studies
To date, there are two macroeconomic case studies on specific terrorism-ridden economies. Both studies are careful and utilize methodologies that could be applied to other countries -e.g., Colombia -that have experienced a prolonged campaign of terrorism. For the Basque region, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) estimated the per capita GDP losses attributable to a twenty-year terrorist campaign. Because the Basque region differs from other regions in Spain, the authors had to construct a "synthetic" comparison region by taking a weighted average combination of other Spanish regions. The weights were chosen to yield the values to key growth variables -e.g., real per capita GDP, investment share of GDP, population density, and human capital measures -that are nearly identical to those of the Basque region prior to its terrorism. Their synthetic region is required to provide a counterfactual "Basque region," whose growth in the absence of terrorism can be compared to the growth in the Basque region in the presence of terrorism. The authors demonstrated that the Basque and synthetic regions displayed similar per capita GDP values prior to 1975 and the start of the terror campaign. Thereafter, a GDP gap opened that averaged 10% over the next twenty years. During high-terrorism episodes, the gap equaled 12%, while, during low-terrorism episodes, the gap closed to 8-9%.
To address a possible "placebo" influence, the authors also instigated the growth of another Spanish region -i.e., Catalonia -that was similar to the Basque region but did not experience terrorism. A synthetic region was also constructed for Catalonia. The authors then showed that there was little gap in real per capita GDP over time for Catalonia and its synthetic region, both of which had no terrorism. The Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) methodology is very clever and could be applied for a country study, provided that a synthetic country can be constructed. Their exercise is probably easier within a country than for an entire country. 2003:Q4. Forecasts were conducted assuming either no subsequent terrorism or terrorism at the levels that actually prevailed for these three years. The differences in forecasts translated into a per capita GDP loss of about 10% for terrorism continuing at its prevailing elevated level.
The four key macroeconomic studies are summarized in Table 1 for ready reference. The first column indicates the study and its basic methodology, 4 while the second column provides a short description of the study. In the right-hand column, some key findings are indicated. There are a number of anticipated differences between how developed and developing countries are able to weather terrorism. Developed countries possess more capable governmental institutions that can apply monetary, fiscal, and other policies to recover from either a large-scale attack or a prolonged campaign. The United States case, discussed above, is instructive. Debt also hinders many developed countries from applying monetary policy to cushion the consequence of a large-scale terrorist attack. Markets are better able in developed, than in developing, countries to respond to terrorism-induced changes in risk. Developed countries are also better equipped than developing countries to monitor their economies to determine the need for monetary or fiscal stimuli following terrorist attacks. In addition, developed countries can take decisive and effective security measures to restore confidence.
Developed and Developing Countries Contrasts
Many less-developed countries lack this capacity. Such security measures can speed recovery.
Because developing countries are more dependent on the rest of the world for demand for their products and services, these countries are more vulnerable than richer countries to terrorism shocks in neighbors and important trading partners. Compared with their richer counterparts, developing countries are less diversified and more apt to experience a larger impact from a sector-specific attack. The earlier Yemen shipping example illustrates this insight. Finally, the presence of internal conflicts in many developing countries compromises their ability to address terrorist attacks, which may resonate with other forms of internal strife.
Microeconomic Consequences of Terrorism
There have been studies dating back to the early 1990s that have investigated the microeconomic consequences of sector-specific attacks. In particular, studies have covered tourism, trade, and financial sectors. Because many of these studies are country specific, methods other than cross-section estimates have been used.
Tourism
Attacks against tourist venues (e.g., airports, hotels, or attractions) or tourist modes of transportation (e.g., airplanes) make a tourist consider the risks involved with their vacation plans. Even a single heinous act at a popular terrorist venue can cause tourists to alter plans by either vacationing at home or else going to a terrorism-free country. Time-series analysis has been used in a number of tourism studies to gauge the impact of terrorism in the target country or In a follow-up study, Enders, Sandler, and Parise (1992) used an autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) analysis with a transfer function to investigate the impact of transnational terrorism on tourism in Austria, Spain, and Italy for 1974-88 -three countries with highly visible transnational terrorist attacks against foreign tourists during this period. The dependent variable was the country's share of tourist receipts from the region. These authors found that terrorism had a significant negative lagged influence on these tourism shares that varied by country: two quarters for Italy, three quarters for Greece, and seven quarters for Austria. Since it takes time for tourists to revise plans, the lags are understandable. Losses varied by country: Austria lost 3.37 billion special drawing rights (SDRs); Italy lost 861 billion SDRs; and Greece lost 472 million SDRs. The authors also showed that some of the lost revenues left a sample of European countries for safer venues in North America. Drakos and Kutan (2003) applied the Enders-Sandler-Parise methodology to Greece, Israel, and Turkey for 1991-2000. These authors used monthly transnational terrorism data, drawn from ITERATE. In addition to the home-country impacts, Drakos and Kutan were interested in cross-country or "spillover" effect -both positive and negative -that may arise if, say, a transnational attack in Israel shifts would-be Israeli tourists to safer venues in Italy, Greece, or elsewhere. Their ARIMA model with a transfer function had an equation for each country's tourist shares, where, say, the share of tourism in Greece depends on: past tourist shares in Greece; current and past terrorist attacks in Greece; current and past terrorist attacks in Israel; and current and past terrorist attacks in Turkey. There was also an equation for tourist shares of Italy, which was a relatively safe haven. Based on transnational terrorist attacks, 5 these authors calculated that Greece lost 9% of its tourism market share; Turkey lost over 5% of its tourism market share; and Israel lost less than 1% of its tourism market. Close to 89% of lost tourism due to terrorism in Europe flowed to safer tourist venues in other countries. 6 Drakos and
Kutan also uncovered significant spillover effects -low-intensity terrorist attacks in Israel reduced Greek tourism revenues.
Net foreign direct investment (NFDI)
Foreign investors must be aware of all kinds of risks, including those posed by terrorism.
This risk is especially germane when a terrorist campaign specifically targets NFDI. Terrorist risks raise the costs of doing business as expensive security measures must be deployed and personnel must be duly compensated, both of which reduce the returns to NFDI. As these risks rise, investors will redirect their investments to safer countries. Enders and Sandler (1996) provided estimates of the effects of terrorism on NDFI in two relatively small European countries -Greece and Spain. Large countries -e.g., France, Germany, and the United Kingdom -draw their foreign capital inflows from many sources and appeared to endure attacks without a measurable aggregate diversion of inflows. Large countries are also better equipped to take defensive measures after an attack to restore confidence. Greece and Spain were selected as case studies insofar as both experienced numerous transnational terrorist attacks aimed at foreign commercial interests during the 1968-91 sample period.
For Spain, we applied an ARIMA model with a transfer function that associated NFDI to its past values and to terrorist attacks; for Greece, we applied a VAR model that related NFDI to its past values and to terrorist attacks. Once again, we modeled a counterfactual exercise, analogous to those for tourism, to compute the terrorism-induced losses in NFDI in these two economies. For Spain, there was a long delay of 11 quarters between the advent of a terrorist incident and the response in NFDI. A typical transnational terrorist incident in Spain was estimated to reduce NFDI by $23.8 million. On average, transnational terrorism reduced annual NFDI in Spain by 13.5%. For Greece, the story was similar, transnational terrorism curbed annual NFDI by 11.9%. These are sizable losses for two small economies that were heavily dependent on NFDI as a source of savings during the sample period.
Trade influence
In a recent contribution, Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) period. Their terrorism data were drawn from ITERATE and only included transnational attacks, even though domestic terrorism would have also affected trade flows. The authors found that the first transnational terrorist attack reduced bilateral trade by almost 10%, which is a very sizable influence that may be picking up the effect of domestic terrorism. Nitsch and Schumacher also found that a doubling of the number of terrorist incidents reduced bilateral trade by 4%; hence, high-terrorism nations had a substantially reduced trade volume. Although more recent terrorism data are available, the authors only examined this historical period, which is not reflective of current-day terrorism.
Financial markets Chen and Siems (2004) applied an event-study methodology to investigate changes in average returns of stock exchange indices to 14 terrorist and military attacks that dated back to
1915. An event study computes abnormal returns -negative or positive -following some shock or occurrence, such as the downing of Pan Am flight 107 or 9/11. These authors showed that the influence of terrorist events on major stock exchanges, if any, is very transitory, lasting just one to three days for most major incidents. The sole exception is 9/11 where DOW values took 40 days to return to normal. These authors also showed that this return period varied according to the stock exchange -exchanges in Norway, Jakarta, Kuala Lampur, and Johannesburg took longer to rebound, while those in London, Helsinki, Tokyo, and elsewhere took less time to rebound. Most terrorist events had little or no impact on major stock exchanges.
Eldor and Melnick (2004) By way of summary, Table 2 indicates the microeconomic studies, their methods, study description, and major findings. can examine cross-border spillovers, as in Drakos and Kutan (2003) .
Methodology Discussion
Panel studies also have advantages and disadvantages as indicated in the bottom half of Table 3 . A crucial variable (e.g., real per capita GDP growth) may display little variation for a country so that identification becomes a problem To circumvent this difficulty, cross-section and panel estimates introduce sufficient variation to enhance identification. Hence, such estimates have a real role to play in identifying the impact of terrorism on various GDP growth measures.
To limit extreme heterogeneity that may arise from diverse samples, cohorts can be constructed.
Moreover, independent variables can control for some heterogeneity -e.g., democratic
institutions or stage of development. If, however, the sample is too heterogeneous, then the "average" picture provided by the coefficient estimates may not be descriptive of the experience of many sample countries. Even some dynamic factors can be introduced by lagging a variable;
however, the amount of dynamic interaction is limited compared with time-series estimates. Some studies use more than one terrorism measure (e.g., BHO, 2004; Tavares, 2004) .
For these studies, the robustness of the economic consequences to alternative measures become a relevant consideration. Both macroeconomic case studies applied clever methods to display substantial economic losses -in the range of 10% of GDP per capita -stemming from protracted terrorist campaigns.
Concluding Remarks
Cross section and panel estimates have shown modest impacts of terrorism on per capita GDP growth. These studies should incorporate both domestic and transnational terrorism data to better gauge the impact of terrorism for cohorts that include just developing countries. There is also a need for additional case studies, especially of developing countries. VAR analysis can be applied to a few countries confronting terrorist campaigns in the same region to capture crossborder influences. In addition, spatial econometrics can identify the dispersion of economic consequences. Microeconomic estimates of terrorism consequences have been informative. The associated methodology can be extended to other countries, especially developed countries, as case studies and small panels. More effort should be expended to identify sector-specific, crossborder spillovers -e.g., in the case of FDI. These methods can also be applied to vulnerable sectors previously unexamined. Terrorism has a small effect on growth on par with that of BHO when standard growth variables are left out. When these variables are included, terrorism has no influence. Evidence is provided that countries with welldeveloped democratic institution can withstand terrorism attacks Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) Case study for Spain Contrast the Basque region with terrorism and a "synthetic" region without terrorism. The latter is based on a weighted composite of other peaceful regions in Spain.
Finds a 10% average gap in per capita GDP that they attribute to terrorism over a twentyyear period Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) VAR for Israel
The four interactive time series include per capita GDP, investment, exports, and nondurable consumption.
Terrorism has a significant negative impact on per capita GDP, investment, and exports. Terrorism's influence on investment and exports is two times its effect on per capita GDP. Counterfactual exercise shows that the high recent levels of terrorism resulted in a 10% annual decline in per capita GDP. VAR denotes vector autoregression 
Drakos and Kutan (2003) ARIMA with a transfer function
Using monthly data for 1991-2000, the study relates a country's share of tourist receipts to terrorism. Focuses on Greece, Israel, and Turkey. Allows for terrorist-induced substitutions within and among regions.
Greece lost about 9% of its tourism market shares due to terrorism; Israel lost less than 1% of its tourism market share due to terrorism; and Turkey lost just over 5% of its tourism market share due to terrorism. About 89% of lost European tourism flowed to safer regions. Enders and Sandler (1996) ARIMA with transfer function for Spain VAR for Greece.
Employs time-series methods to ascertain losses in net foreign direct investment (NFDI) due to terrorism. The sample period is 1968-91.
On average, terrorism reduced annual NFDI in Spain by 13.5%, while it lowered annual NFDI in Greece by 11.9%. There was a long lag between an incident and its impact on NFDI. Large rich countries weathered terrorism without displaying a loss in NFDI. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) 
Trade-gravity model
Terror attacks are added to a gravity model to ascertain their impact on bilateral trades for over 200 countries for 1960-93. Independent variables include a language dummy, a colonizer dummy, common border, and other controls.
Terrorist incidents in a trading partner reduce bilateral trade by almost 10%, compared with terrorism-free trading partners.
VAR denotes vector autoregression and ARIMA is autoregressive integrated moving average. This study applies the events-study methodology to uncover how many days are required for stock markets to recover their value after a large-scale terrorist attack.
For the Dow, market value is recovered in 1 to a few days following large-scale terrorist attacks. For 9/11, the Dow recovered in 40 days. Major conflicts are associated with long recovery periods.
Eldor and Melnick (2004) Time-series methods
Relies on time-series methods to display the influence of terrorist attacks on the Israeli stock market. Daily observations are utilized.
The terrorist campaign beginning on September 27, 2000 lowered stock values on the Tel Aviv exchange by 30%. Only suicide attacks had a significant influence. The size of the attack in terms of casualties was a significant determinant of financial market losses. 
Time-series estimation
Advantages
• There is no need to construct a behavioral model with explicit exogenous and endogenous variables.
• Dynamic processes can be readily identified; i.e., can evaluate shocks and the pattern of adjustment over time.
• Forecasts can be provided.
• Microeconomic impacts can be readily identified.
• Cross-border spillovers can be estimated.
Disadvantages
• The estimated model may be atheoretical with no antecedent behavioral model.
• The number of countries examined is severely limited.
• A large number of observations are required.
• A generalized picture across nations is not given.
Panel estimation
Advantages
• A wide variety of countries can be considered.
• Variation in key variables (e.g., per capita GDP growth) is larger; hence, identification is enhanced.
• Degrees of freedom are large.
• The influence of terrorism on cohorts can be compared and contrasted.
Disadvantages
• The estimation's average picture may not be descriptive of many sample countries, especially when the panel includes vastly diverse countries. This heterogeneity is a problem when it is not controlled.
• Data problems may arise from using different sources.
• The dynamic effect of terrorism on key variables are often not displayed.
• Cross-border spillovers are difficult to identify.
Table 4. Economic impact of terrorism: summarizing principles
• For most economies, the macroeconomic consequences of terrorism are generally modest and of a short-term nature.
• Large diversified economies are able to withstand terrorism and not display adverse macroeconomic influences. Recovery is rapid even from a large-scale terrorist attack.
• Developed countries can use monetary and fiscal policies to offset adverse economic impacts of large-scale attacks. Well-developed institutions also cushion the consequences.
• The immediate costs of most terrorist attacks are localized, thereby causing a substitution of economic activity away from a vulnerable sector to relatively safe areas. Prices can then reallocate capital and labor quickly.
• Terrorism can cause a reallocation from investment to government spending.
• The effects of terrorism on key economic variables -e.g., net foreign direct investment -are anticipated to be greatest in small economies confronted with a sustained terrorist campaign.
• Some terrorist-prone sectors -e.g., tourism -have displayed substantial losses following terrorist attacks. In the absence of further attacks, these sectors rebound rather quickly.
• Small countries, plagued with significant terrorist campaigns, display macroeconomic consequences in terms of losses in GDP per capita.
